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Abstract 
Nigerian stock market was rated low before the year 2006. The rating changed afterwards to one of the emerging 
market economies of the world. Trading activities increased significantly until the recent global financial crisis struck 
hard on the entire economy. This study looks critically into the issue of stock pricing and the various changes that 
occurred in the characteristics of banks’ stocks prices during the most recent global financial crisis. With a panel of 
10 banks, this study adopts a pooled least square regression analysis method. Among other things, this study finds 
out that both when the banks are pooled together into one and when studied individually, dividend at previous period 
is a statistically significant determinant of stock pricing. Also the size of traded stock of seven (7) of the 10 banks 
studied exerts significant negative effect on the prices of the seven banks’ stocks, leaving only three (3) to be 
insignificant. Against the apriori expectation, increase in the economic growth rate of the Nigerian economy leads to 
decrease in the stock prices of 9 out of the 10 studied banks. Of these 9 banks’ stock prices, 7 receive significant 
impact from economic growth rate. Based on the policy implications of the finding above and so many more, this 
research study offers some policy recommendations that may be employed to avert such disastrous effects of 
financial crisis on the investors.      
Keywords:Financial Crisis, Bank Stock Prices, Bank Fundamentals, Macroeconomic variables. 
 
1. Introduction 
A little over a decade ago, the Nigerian stock market would not elicit much interest, either to investors or to 
researchers. The market was clearly underdeveloped and poorly rated. Movements in stock prices were sluggish and 
volumes of transactions were low. However, in the later part of the same decade, the market experienced a boom – a 
boom which beginning ‘coincided’ with the Central Bank of Nigeria banking consolidation programme in 2004. The 
consolidation policy, meant to raise the minimum capital base of banks from N2 billion to N25 billion, ushered in a 
period persistent issue of shares by the various banks that led to a robust awareness among the general public 
matched with a buying fever. investment, and consequently, market capitalization soared within months. As indicated 
in Figure 1 of Appendix I, all indices of the stock market surged after 2005, with market capitalization exceeding the 
N2, 000 billion mark for the first time. By 2007, capitalization has shot up to N13,000 billion. As the market grew, so 
also did the share of the banking sector in the market grow. While market capitalization grew by 160.70 per cent 
between 2004 and 2006, the share of the banking sector rose from 34.4 percent of total market capitalization in 2004 
to 41.8 percent in 2006. Between 2004 and 2006 alone, banking sector capitalization grew by 223 percent. In fact, 
over 46 percent of the total growth in market capitalization came from the growth in banking sector capitalization 
alone (Somoye, 2008).  
But the honeymoon did not last. It ended in 2007 and the coming of 2008 ushered in a new era for the stock market. 
Nigerians may debate the source of the crisis that hit the market and/or its relationship with the US-subprime-led 
crisis in the rest of the world, but there are no debates about the consequences of the crisis in the Nigerian market. 
All indices of the market took a plunge in exactly the same phenomenal fashion that they grew, only this time a little 
faster. Some banks’ shares, for example, United Bank for Africa fell by as much as 52% from N64 per share to only 
N33.9 per share within just one month between May and June 2008 (Cash Craft Assets Management, 2011). Many 
others did not fare much better. Market capitalisation which stood at N12.5 trillion as at February 2008 fell to only 
N9.7 trillion as at August of the same year: a withdrawal/loss of N2.8 trillion worth of investment from the market 
within a period of just six months! This withdrawal is more than half of the quarterly GDP in current prices of N4,85 
trillion recorded within the second quarter of the pre-crisis period of 2007 (CBN, 2009).  
The implications of such drastic changes for a young market like the Nigerian Stock Exchange are not miniscule at 
all. Investor confidence has been at its lowest and all attempts to revive it for a period of over three years have failed. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 3, No 10, 2012 
 
17 
In fact, after about six months of the free fall, the Nigerian Stock Exchange at some point changed the rules and 
capped maximum allowable daily price losses of any share at one percent. This was in a bid to arrest the massive 
slide in share prices. Secondly, access to operating capital for quoted firms including banks has been grossly limited. 
In fact, the Nigerian banking sector entered into a secondary crisis arising from liquidity constraints. The crisis also 
opened a can of worms on the debt portfolios of many banks. The crisis also threatened the very existence of the 
fragile and re-emerging middle class, most of whom had heavy investment in the market with inadequate education 
about its workings. Every regulator, beginning from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Central Bank 
and even the Ministry of Finance is concerned. But effectiveness of policy intervention has been circumscribed by 
limited understanding of the factors driving the crisis, their interrelationships and the most appropriate instruments 
for managing them. 
Some scholars believe that the crisis could have been averted. But averting it or not depends on understanding the 
driving factors for the fall in prices. There are three possible sources of a crisis of this nature: the first are distortions 
in company fundamentals, the second consist of macroeconomic variables, while the third are external factors. 
Where the factors are mainly company fundamentals, it may be possible to arrest them by closer compliance 
monitoring and regulation. But to establish this, there should be evidence of correlation or causation. Where they are 
macroeconomic indicators, policy instruments and application will also be different, probably more difficult to apply. 
Where the factors are basically external, interventions will concentrate on policy instruments that could help to hedge 
the economy from external shocks. But so far, there had been a lot of newspaper articles, opinion forums, and sub-
guesses but little (if any) scientific study trying to explain the crisis. This study, therefore, intends to provide 
preliminary evidence on the relative importance of these three sets of factors in driving the crisis. It specifically sets 
out to ask the question: what are the relative contributions of the different sets of potential contributory factors to 
bank stock pricing on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange during the financial crisis?  
 
2. The Model 
There are five schools of thought with respect to stock price behaviour. They include the fundamentalist schools, the 
technical school, the random walk hypothesis school, the behavioural school of finance, and macro-economic 
hypothesis school. This study intends to analyse three major aspects of determinants of stock pricing – bank 
fundamentals, macroeconomic environment, and the foreign investors’ participation level. Therefore, of all the five 
schools of thoughts, this study adopts the approaches of the fundamentalists and the macroeconomic factor schools 
of thought. Fundamental factor models use the returns to portfolios associated with observed security attributes such 
as dividend yield, book-to-market ratio, and industry identifiers (Sun and Zhang, 2001). This is in line with the 
assertion of Durand (1955) that book value, dividends, earnings, total assets, and total capital are all determinants of 
asset price. 
This implies an equation of the form: 
BSP = f(DIVt-1, SIZE, VOT, FPIri, INT, GDPr)               (1) 
where 
DIVt-1 = Declared Dividend at time t-1 
SIZEt = Size of the Bank, measured as total bank shares as a ratio of the total banking sector shares 
VOTt = Volume of Trade, measured as total number of traded shares divided by the total volume of shares 
owned by the bank 
INTt = Interest Rate 
GDPrt = Growth Rate of National Output 
FPIrit = Rate of change in Foreign Portfolio Investment in the bank 
Given the above, the estimable equation for this study can be stated as: 
 
The Model 
BSPi = β0 + β1DIVit-1 + β2SIZEi + β3VOTi + β4FPIri + β5INT + β6GDPr + µ i             (2) 
where 
i = the banks, i.e. 1, 2, ..., 10 
β0 = the intercept of the model 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 = the slopes or parameters of the model 
µ = the stochastic variable. 
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This study covers the period of 2006 to 2010 in monthly series. Therefore, a period of 60 months is studied in all. 
However, the crisis period of June 2008 to March 2010 (i.e. 22 months) is also considered alone. In this case, two 
analyses are done, first for the entire period, and the second for the crisis period alone. 
Panel Data analysis is carried out in this study. A primary motivation for using panel data is to solve the problem of 
omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2002; Brooks, 2008). Compared to the use of ordinary time series or ordinary cross-
sectional data, panel data has the advantages that since it relate to individuals, firms, states, countries, etc., over time, 
there is bound to be heterogeneity in these units. Several methods of data estimation exist, as can be seen in some 
other studies that employed panel data analysis. Among these methods are: Panel Data Analysis of Covariance 
adopted by Durand (1955); VAR model of Panel Data analysis adopted by Eun and Shim (1989), Rangvid (2001), 
Elyasiani, et al (1998); and Panel Logit model adopted by Derrien (2005). However, the nature of the study defines 
the estimation method to be adopted by a particular work. For instance, if this study wanted to look at the probability 
of investors investing in the stocks of the banks in the face of the existence of several options to be included in their 
portfolio, then the study would have been expected to employ Panel Probit method of estimation. In like manner, if 
this study had been on finding out the level of fluctuations (volatility) caused by and within the factors, then a 
Generalised Auto-regressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model could have been employed. However, 
this study is to look at pricing characteristics of bank stocks in Nigeria, therefore a Panel Least Square method of 
estimation is rational. This is in line with Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr. (2003) who used Panel Data Ordinary Least 
Square method of estimation in their analysis of Initial Public Offering (IPO) pricing in dot-com bubble.  
 
3. Empirical Findings and Implications 
Observations from the empirical results presented in Appendix II, Tables 1 – 2 show that bank stock prices rise with 
rising declared dividend at previous time period for each of the banks and for all the banks pooled together. This 
finding supports the assertion that investors would invest their money in stocks that will yield the highest level of 
outcome or returns. Therefore, since declared dividend is the actual return on investment to investors, it is not 
surprising that increasing it will also lead to increases in stock prices. However, when the entire bank stocks are 
lumped, the magnitude of influence increased from 0.131 to 0.168 for the entire period, and 0.0323 to 0.0724 for the 
Crisis period only. 
The Volume of Trade as a variable, represented by the ratio of trading of individual bank stocks relative to the stocks 
of the banking industry, has positive relationship with the stock price, with varying magnitudes. For banks like 
Access, Diamond, Fidelity, Guaranty, Platinum, and Wema, the impact is not very large, with less than 50% 
influence , implying that a 100% increase in the volume of trade of the stocks causes less than 50% increase in the 
prices of these banks’ stocks. On the other hand, the volume of trade of the stocks of FBN, IBTC, UBA and Zenith 
has coefficients that are above 50 points on change in the stock prices while the impact is highest in Zenith Bank 
stocks. The impact of changes in volumes of stocks on stock prices is quite high for FBN at 82.4%, IBTC at 52.8% , 
UBA at 93.6%  while Zenith is as high as over 169% . When lumped together, the impact of a 100 percent change in 
volume of banks’ stocks on prices reduces to as low as 21%.  
The crisis period comes with some forms of changes. In the first model considered above, the magnitude of the effect 
of the volume of traded stock on the prices of stocks for that of Zenith Bank exceeded that of every other bank. On 
the contrary, the volume of traded stocks of the IBTC Bank exceeded that of every other bank by showing that a 100 
percent increase in the volume of traded stock of IBTC will mean a 248.1 percent increase in the pricing of stocks. 
The volume of trading of Wema Bank stocks impacts the lowest on the pricing of stocks of Wema Bank. A critical 
point in the analysis of the crisis period is the relationship between the volume of trading of Fidelity Bank stocks and 
the prices of the Fidelity Bank stocks. The pricing of stocks of Fidelity Bank decreases with increase in the volume 
of trade of the stocks of Fidelity Bank. This is a contradiction of the situation found with pricing of the stocks of 
other banks. In this situation, it implies that the volume of trading of the stocks of Fidelity Bank, which should 
follow the law of inverse demand (the higher the demand over supply, the higher the price), is rather an abnormal 
price function of demand. This implies that the market price is not a function of the forces of demand and supply. In 
a situation like this, it will not be unimaginable for the macroeconomic variables and the volatile macroeconomic 
environment to be the major determinant of such pricing behaviour.  
A look at the variable of the size of traded bank stock with respect to the total banking sector volume of traded stocks 
shows that in the Model (for the entire Periods), all the banks stocks exhibit negative coefficients with varying 
magnitudes. The same negative coefficients with varying magnitudes are also observed in Model II, whereas the 
same Model (for Crisis Period alone) presents a different case. In the model, while some exhibit positive coefficient, 
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most others exhibit negative coefficients with varying magnitudes. Even though a negative relationship is established 
between the size of a bank’s traded stocks with respect to the entire traded stocks of the banking sector, the size of 
Zenith Bank stocks has the highest level of influence on the stock prices among the stocks of other banks, with a 
coefficient of 1.902. In this case, a unit increase in the size of the traded Zenith Bank stocks will cause almost two 
units (1.9) decrease in the price of Zenith Bank stock on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Second on the list 
of highly affecting size of traded stocks of a particular bank is the stock of UBA. The UBA stock size in the same 
Model (for all periods) is ranked second in affecting or influencing the pricing of the bank’s stock. In the same way, 
the size of Fidelity Bank Stock made the least impact on the pricing of their stock in that model. This is shown by the 
coefficient values of -0.185. These values also imply that a unit increase in the size of the bank traded stock with 
respect to the entire banking sector traded stocks causes 0.19 units of decrease in the price of Fidelity Bank stock. It 
is worth investigating that in the model that covers all periods, the coefficient of the variable (SIZEt) for Fidelity 
Bank Stock is the least among other banks, and positive while others are negative in the model of crisis period only. 
This positive relationship implies that the price of the stock increases with increase in the size of the bank stock with 
respect to the entire stocks of the banking sector. The observed form of relationship can be justified on the ground 
that the size is a function of demand and not that of supply. In this case, a higher demand will imply a higher size of 
the bank stocks and invariably lead to increased price level of the stocks of the particular bank. 
Considering interest rate as a macroeconomic variable, the results conform to apriori expectations with only few 
deviations. Just as Sharpe (1973) notes investment in stocks is an alternative to investment in bond. Investment in 
bond on its own is a direct function of the prevailing interest rate. So, investment in stocks is an inverse function of 
the market interest rate; the reason being that investors draw their portfolio from both bond and stocks or from either. 
In this situation, it is theoretically established that increase in interest rate should reduce investment in stocks thereby 
causing a decrease in stock prices. All the stocks prices in the model apparently are consistent with this theory with 
the exception of Wemabank stocks price. The magnitude of the influence of change in interest rate on changes in 
stock prices is highest with respect to Zenith Bank stock, where the coefficient of interest rate is -1.739. This implies 
that a unit increase in the market interest rate will lead to 1.7 units decrease in the price of the bank’s stocks. Market 
interest has the lowest impact on stock price of UBA stocks, with a unit increase in the market interest rate leading to 
only 0.011 percentage reduction in UBA stock prices. However, when all the banks are lumped into one group and 
the coefficients are taken as common coefficients, a unit increase in the market interest rate leads to 0.814 percentage 
loss in the prices of the entire banking sector stocks. 
The observed variations in the nature of relationship that exists between the market interest rate and the stock prices 
are in line with the existing empirical studies. This is because the relationship between the market interest rate and 
demand-driven stock prices has always been a very critical point. Sharpe (1973) maintains that investors had 
concluded that bonds are now the superior investment medium, even though stocks continue to command a large 
following. Theoretically, neither should completely dominate the other: some combinations of bonds and stocks 
should prove superior to either taken alone. However, some empirical works by scholars like Shiller (2007), Cifter 
and Ozun (2007), Khrawish, et al (2010), etc. have shown that interest rate can either exert positive or negative effect 
on the prices of stocks within the economy. For instance, Shiller (2007) and Cifter and Ozun (2007) find a negative 
relationship between nominal interest rate and the stock prices, while Khrawish, et al (2010) find out a positive 
relationship between government interest rate and the stocks prices. 
Inferring from the results of the moodel for Crisis-period alone, it is also observed that interest rate has various 
effects on the stock prices of the various banks under study. With the highest inverse effect on the price of Fidelity 
Bank stocks, and lowest inverse effect on the price of Bank PHB stocks, a direct effect of interest rate on stock prices 
is observed with respect to the stock of Stanbic – IBTC Bank. The implication of such result is that while other 
stocks prices will decrease with increasing interest rate, the stock price of Stanbic-IBTC Bank will increase with 
increase in the market interest rate. Pooling the entire banking sector stocks together, it is observed that a unit 
increase in the market interest rate led to 0.64 unit decrease in the total stock prices. 
The model for both the entire-periods and the crisis-period alone show results where all but one stock price increased 
with increase in interest. Not only that, the relationship is equally positive for the pooled results of all 10 banks’ 
stocks. This result is unique indeed. However, it can be argued that during the crisis period, monetary authority 
(CBN) reduced the market interest rate. This period of decrease in the market interest rate coincides with the period 
of decrease in stock prices. This could be the only explanation for a direct relationship of stock prices with the 
market interest rate.  
It is observed from the first model that stock prices decrease with increase in the growth rate of economic output 
within Nigerian economy. This effect is observed for all the banks with the exception of Zenith Bank stock where a 
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unit change in the growth rate of national output leads to 0.76 units of direct change in the pricing of the bank stock. 
On the whole, the kind of relationship found between the entire banking sector stocks prices and the growth rate of 
national output is such that a unit increase in economic growth meant 1.9 (almost 2) units decrease in stock prices. 
National economic growth has the highest inverse effect on the pricing of Wema Bank stocks, and the lowest inverse 
effect on the pricing of First Bank stocks, with coefficients of -3.05 and -0.09 respectively. 
When the crisis period alone is considered, a unit increase in the economic growth rate led to 1.07 units increase in 
the pricing of IBTC bank stocks. The same positive relationship/effect is found for the stock price of GTB. However, 
the magnitude of the effect for that of GTB is lower than that of IBTC (0.55 compared to 1.07). With the exception 
of these two banks’ stocks, all other banks stocks prices had negative relationship with the economic growth rate 
during the crisis period, with varying magnitudes. The highest impact was on Bank PHB stocks where a unit increase 
in economic growth led to 2.77 percentage decrease in prices. For others like Diamond bank, a unit increase in 
economic growth led to 0.81 units decrease in the price, Uniquely, impact of economic growth on First Bank Stocks 
during the crisis period was almost one for one but in opposite direction. (i.e. coefficient of impact was 1.00). 
Pooling all banks together, a unit increase in economic growth implied 1.21 units decrease in the pricing of banks 
stocks during the crisis period. 
The variable of foreign Portfolio Investment growth in each of the banks could not be regressed as cross-section 
specific variable. This was on account of the nature of the data. For some of the banks, the value of the variable was 
zero throughout the study period and so could not be regressed as cross-section specific variable, but was only be 
regressed as a common variable across cross-sections. In the first observation where all other variables are 
considered cross-section specific, and Dividend at the previous period and foreign portfolio investment (i.e. DIVt-1 
and FPIrt) are considered common variables across cross-sections, it is observed that in Model I, banks stock prices 
increase with increase in the growth of foreign portfolio investment (FPI). However, this effect is very minimal 
(impact of 0.00000046 on stock prices for unit increase in FPI). However, when all the discrete variables are 
considered cross-section specific, the effect of growth in foreign portfolio investment on stock prices changed both in 
sign and magnitude. The relationship becomes negative, implying that an increase in the growth of foreign portfolio 
investment leads to decrease in the stock prices (with unit increase in foreign portfolio investment into the Nigeria 
stock market leading to 0.000000038 units decrease in stock prices).  
Observations from the model for crisis-period alone show that increase in foreign portfolio investment in the banks 
leads to decrease in banks’ stocks prices. Looking at the first instance where all other variables are taken as cross-
section specific variables, it is obvious that the inverse effect is deeper than when all the variables are taken as 
common variables across the entire cross-sections. The first case yields 0.0000036 while the second case yields 
0.00000016. The two imply that in the first case, a unit increase in the value of foreign portfolio investment in banks 
leads to 0.0000036 units decrease in the total banks stocks prices, while the same unit increase in the rate of foreign 
portfolio investment in banks in the second case will lead to 0.00000016 units decrease in the banks stocks prices.  
 
3.1 Implications of the Findings 
The study yielded three key findings: 
 Stock prices respond positively to increases in declared dividends of the banks;   
 Meanwhile, they are not so positively affected by economic growth; 
 We could not find evidence that divestment by foreign portfolio investors is a threat to Nigerian stock market. 
The implication of the first two findings is that stocks price during the crisis were affected more by dwindling 
declared dividends even in the face of positive overall economic growth. This is not surprising given that bank 
executives inflated their financial reports and posted huge profits that were not consistent with either economic 
growth or bank fundamentals. These inflated reports led to inflated dividends to shareholders which in turn induced 
shareholders to price stocks higher in the subsequent periods. When the crisis made it impossible to inflate financial 
reports, the dividends also disappeared leading to loss of confidence in the shares. The stock prices also responded 
sharply to the dividend cuts and fell, even though economic growth remained positive.  
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Of the three variables of bank and market fundamentals, the size of traded stocks is both insignificant and negatively 
related to bank stock prices. This implies that policies aimed at only taking care of the size of traded stocks of a 
particular bank may not be effective in stabilising stock pricing in the future. This inability arises from the fact that 
investors seem not to base their pricing behaviours and decisions on the size of offered stocks of a particular bank 
with respect to the entire banking sector total traded stocks. Rather, investors’ pricing behaviours and decisions are 
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based on the expected returns from the investments, thus explaining the positive and significant impact of dividend 
on stock pricing. Interest rate and economic growth rate are the two macroeconomic variables considered in this 
study. First of all, interest rate, even though negatively related, is an insignificant determinant of pricing of most of 
banks. This implies that interest rate regulation may not be a good policy measure for stock prices stabilisation. On 
the contrary, economic growth is both a significant and negative determinant of stock pricing for most of the banks. 
But it is contrary to apriori expectation that even when economic growth is on the increase, stock prices will be 
decreasing or vice versa. However, these findings support the explanations of Akerlof and Shiller (2009) about the 
animal spirits. According to them, there are some investments which investors are not supposed to make given 
calculated and quantitative information about the investment window. But due to overconfidence behaviour of man 
(or trust), he carries on with the investment. Many Nigerian investors in the capital market came into the market at 
the time of boom, and therefore have come to believe that the rising prices of stocks will continue in that way. This 
led several into buying for arbitrage reasons and not for long term investment with expectation of dividend. Trading 
for capital gain immediately replaced trading for dividend accumulation. At this point, investors are no longer 
interested in the macroeconomic condition of the economy within which this market operates. Since the market is not 
divorced from its immediate macroeconomic environment, it is not insulated either from a contagion effect of crisis 
in the economy. As can be seen from the analysis, even though the severity of the effects of most of the included 
variables is declining during the crisis period, yet the prices keep on deteriorating. It may not be explained that the 
crisis is imported through withdrawal of foreign investors in the Nigerian stock market. Yet, it may be explained to 
be connected to the unregulated investment of Nigerian banks in foreign economies which led to huge losses of 
invested capital (of course, depositors and shareholders’ funds). The loss also reflected in the earnings per share 
which is also a determinant of declared dividend per share. Since investors still consider expected rate of returns, this 
could be the reason for the large placement of stocks for sale on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. This study 
will not have revealed anything if it fails to add that the place of management of information is of critical importance. 
Banks on their own sponsored both the persistent increase in stock prices before the crisis and the sharp decline 
during the crisis. This is because, Sau (2003) notes that ultimately, banks do not only acquire information but they 
also produce it. The opening of credit to an entrepreneur effectively represents a signal to "society" of his reliability, 
which facilitates the creation of long-term relationship between the firm, its clients, and its suppliers. Going by this 
analysis, opening of loanable funds to investors in stock market is also a dangerous signal that the market is 
promising, while the sharp withdrawal of loanable funds from the market sends the wrong signal that the market is 
about to crash. Therefore, banks’ financial intermediation is very critical in the movements of stock prices before and 
during the crisis. Based on the findings of this study, the following policy options are recommended for forestalling 
future crisis and for recuperating from the recent one: 
⇒ Banks should make efforts to improve on their corporate governance that will enhance increased profits, which 
will lead to consistent dividend policy so as to stabilise the pricing of their stocks based on investors expected 
returns. 
⇒ The existing financial regulatory system has proved insufficient in forestalling a crisis and consequently losses 
in the economy. Therefore, there need for improved regulation of the stock pricing and stock market activities 
so as to reduce or forestall the possibility of recurrence of such crisis in the nearest future. 
⇒ When loans are the basis of investment in stocks, then pricing and therefore investment will only be for short-
term arbitrage reasons and not for long term shareholding. To curb this situation, investors should be sensitised 
to invest with long term reasons from their personal capital and not from loans. 
⇒ When loans are the only source of capital, investors are liable to bid higher with the hope of future higher prices. 
Overconfidence behaviour plays more when loans are based only on paper collaterals. If the financial 
institutions will still finance stock investment, then collateral in real estate and other forms of capital should be 
demanded for and not share certificate.  
⇒ Participation of foreign investors should be properly monitored to avoid divestment problem as a result of 
multiplier and/or contagion effect of panic in their home economies. 
⇒ The macroeconomic environment should also be made as transparent as possible to allow investors know when 
there is a panic, instead of taking decisions based on mismanaged information. 
⇒ Finally, since profits of banks seem to be privatised and losses seem socialised, proper regulation is needed to 
guide their participation in foreign financial activities to reduce risk of contagion effect of panic in foreign 
economy. 
Financial crises can be forestalled or at least ameliorated. However, this is not possible except proper policy steps are 
taken. These policy options cannot be fully understood and applied without having a proper understanding of the 
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causes of the panic and crisis. It is widely believed that financial crisis comes as a result of stock prices having 
deviated severely away from the fundamentals of the firms that own the stocks. This implies that financial crisis is 
closely tied to stock pricing. It has been established in this study that stock pricing in Nigeria has been responding 
positively to the fundamentals of the firms and therefore, could not have been the source of crisis. Instead, stock 
prices responded severely to the crisis. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Figure 1: Total Market Capitalisation of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 2000 – 2007  
 
Source: Data from the CBN Statistical Bulletin (2007) 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
TABLE 1: Panel Regression Result of Model I for All Periods (2006–2010) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 29.32923 3.105158 9.445328 0.0000 
DIV? 0.168236 0.008999 18.69406 0.0000 
SIZE? -0.471732 0.091932 -5.131324 0.0000 
VOT? 21.23531 4.706202 4.512197 0.0000 
FPIR? -3.84E-08 1.75E-07 -0.219460 0.8264 
INT? -0.814046 0.146668 -5.550281 0.0000 
GDPR? -1.897422 0.383906 -4.942416 0.0000 
R-squared 0.413002     Mean dependent var 15.42412 
Adjusted R-squared 0.407062     S.D. dependent var 13.08008 
S.E. of regression 10.07198     Sum squared resid 60156.74 
Log likelihood -2233.697     F-statistic 69.53737 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.208420     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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TABLE 2: Panel Regression Result of Model I for Crisis Period (June 2008–March 2010) Only 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 13.73110 4.216673 3.256383 0.0012 
DIV? 0.162941 0.008555 19.04605 0.0000 
SIZE? -0.313095 0.089589 -3.494786 0.0005 
VOT? 11.70074 4.632107 2.526008 0.0118 
FPIR? 1.02E-07 1.67E-07 0.609130 0.5427 
INT? -0.457102 0.287274 -1.591169 0.1121 
GDPR? 0.638889 0.477191 1.338854 0.1811 
D1? -8.219857 1.530502 -5.370694 0.0000 
D2? -10.54833 1.772803 -5.950086 0.0000 
R-squared 0.474284     Mean dependent var 15.42412 
Adjusted R-squared 0.467167     S.D. dependent var 13.08008 
S.E. of regression 9.547852     Sum squared resid 53876.43 
Log likelihood -2200.619     F-statistic 66.64757 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.185251     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
  
